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Summary
This paper discusses a few of the questions that the use of computer-based tools in
administrative practice poses to poütics and to legal theory. Two of these tools will be
presented äs case studies. Hard political and legal-theoretical questions may need
reconsideration since some of the delicate balances, vital to the constitutional state are
being challenged by information-technological developments. Our analysis focuses on the
identification ofthose topoi where leverage is alreadyfelt or where it is to be expected in
the nearfuture. The potential of information-technological tools is immense but are we
ready toface the consequences?
l. Introduction
The last decennia have shown the applicability of computer-based tools to be virtually
without any limit. Some applications within the legal practice have proven possible. We
describe two examples of such applications. One System (JES) is already in use, the other
(CIS) has by now been on the planning board for four months. Status, background,
chosen Solutions and foreseeable pitfalls of these Systems will be discussed in Sections 2
and 3. Further analysis of the case studies reveals that the growth of knowledge will
provide a serious cause for political debate and for revisiting some well-known legal-
theoretical issues: the relations between what is known to be possible and what ought to
be dorie about it. In Section 4 we discuss these relations and conclude that the role played
by Information technology requests serious democratic attention and debate. In Section 5
we take pari in the debate, anchoring our argumentation at the foremost equilibria that
have proven to be useful for (democratic) political and legal-theoretical stability. We
mention (a) egalitarianism vs. individualism, (b) checks & balances and (c) perfectionism
vs. liberalism. In Section 6 we present our conclusions.
2. JES
As a first case study we examine an expert System supporting the process of providing
licences for the discharge of effluent on the Dutch surface waters. The expert System is
called JES, standing for "Juridisch Expert Systeem". It has been developed by
Rijkswaterstaat (Ministry of Transport and Public Works) and leim (Informatics Centre
for Infrastructure and Environment). By now JES is a System in füll Operation.
2.1. Background
One of the assignments of Rijkswaterstaat is the granting of licences prescribed in the
Water Pollution Act (Wet verontreiniging oppervlaktewateren, WVO). The object of the
Act is to oppose and prevent the pollution of water. To achieve this the discharge of
effluent is regulated by licences. Discharging into open water without a licence is
forbidden, for domestic äs well äs commercial waste water. Indirect discharge via sewers
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is also regulated by way of licences. The drafting of a specific licence depends on a
combination of disciplines. On the one band juridical expertise is needed to ensure that
the licence is juridically correct. On the other hand technical knowledge, i.e., knowledge
of the substances and techniques used in households and in industrial processes, is
necessary to be able to assess the pollution and countermeasures to be taken.
The authorities aim at adapting the Services to the needs of the citizens and at rendering
high quality Services. For the granting of licences this means procedural correctness and
insight into the enforcement of the procedures, correct licences and rapid processing of
the requests. The current licence-granting practice does not fulfill these goals due to two
Problems: (7) legal verification and (2) regionally diverging licence-granting policies.
l. The greater pari of the licences is granted by technical experts exclusively. It is
mainly based on precedents (notably on similarities in processes and substances
used). In some cases the outcome is legally incorrect because technical experts do
not always possess the required juridical expertise. Verification by professional
jurists is therefore necessary, but not comprehensively performed due to
governmental expenditure restrictions.
2. Rijkswaterstaat is divided into regions. Discrepancies between regional licence-
granting policies have emerged. Uniformity in licensing policy between the regions
is a goal set by the competent administration (Rijkswaterstaat itself)· This goal has
proven hard to be achieved by conventional means.
2.2. The solution
2.2.1. Legal verification
One of the main problems that leads to the lack of verification is the workload of the
jurists. Their capacity does not allow the verification of all licences. Taking on extra
jurists is not possible because of the restrictions in governmental expenditure. The
solution chosen provides for standardization of relatively simple licences in such a way
that only the complex licences remain to be verified by jurists. (The distinction between
Standard cases and hard case is non-standard, consequently the preliminary categorization
is performed by the jurists).
Standardization of relatively simple licences is achieved by JES [Van Adrichem, 1992].
JES consists of two distinguishable parts, a reasoning pari and a presentation part The
reasoning part is an expert System in which rules lead to conclusions. All kinds of
procedural and technical aspects are considered. Per request a communication Session is
necessary in which all relevant data of the request are being asked. The questions are the
same äs those on the application form. The data are used to derive conclusions, of which
the most important one is whether or not a licence can be granted. The expertise realized
in JES, both juridical and technical, is elicitated from the experts of Rijkswaterstaat. The
presentation part is a separate program which communicates with the knowledge base.
The program decides, depending on data retrieved from the knowledge base, which texts
are to be used. JES produces text models of licences for Standard cases in word-
processing format; they only need to be printed and signed. However, the word-
processing format allows the users to append and edit the text, using a Standard
wordprocessor. This feature may in the future prove useful to prepare the Standard parts
of complex licences, and to append the more complex articles.
2.2.2. Discrepancies in policies
Standardization makes it possible to speed up the correct processing of the simple
licences, thereby creating capacity for the processing and the legal verification of complex
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licences. As an added bonus, it concurrently solves, for standardized cases, the problem
of discrepancies in licence-granting policies between the different regions. We do not see
a problem regarding diverging policies in hard, complex or non-standard cases. For these
cases there is, qualitate qua, no policy available at all (cf. for the elaboration of an
analogous problem Section 3.1).
2.3. The pitfalls
2.3.I.User friendliness
The WVO is a fairly broad law. To represent the complete law at once is impossible. The
first selecüon of subdomains has been made in mutual agreement between Rijkswaterstaat
and leim. The restriction to a subdomain made it possible to show results in an early
stage of the project, enhancing the acceptance by users. In a later stage other, more
complex, parts were added to the knowledge base. The choice for a user friendly System
(combining Nexpert Object and WordPerfect under MS Windows) further helped to
facilitate the acceptance by potential users. The complexity of the System does not show,
and does not make the system's behaviour incomprehensible.
2.3.2. Knowledge elicitation
The knowledge of the experts is not easy to obtain. Most of the technical knowledge is
implicit. The explanation of technical features to non-technicians is very difficult. The
explanation of implicit technical knowledge, derived from experience, to non-technicians
is an even harder problem. The same goes for explaining juridical knowledge to Software
engineers. These processes bear in themselves the risk of building an invalid expert
System. The communication between the experts and the developers is therefore the most
important factor in a successful realization of such a project. Moreover, in creating the
knowledge base we found that reflections that should play a part in the granting process
are often left out, because of miscommunication between experts. Relevant rules known
to experts of one of the disciplines proved to be totally unknown to the other.
The juridical correctness of the System depends on the Information the jurists provide
during knowledge acquisition. They are responsible for interpreting the law and
incorporating jurisprudence. This also holds for the technical correctness, it depends on
the skills of the technicians. Consequently, the responsibility for assessing the
correctness of the granted licences remains with Rijkswaterstaat because it is the
competent governmental body, äs well äs the provider of the expertise.
2.3.3. High-quality aims and perfection
The Interpretation of the law by machine needs to be pragmatic. The law is designed to be
suitable to all conceivable circumstances. We find the law to describe exceptions on
normal ruling, and possibly exceptions on the exceptions, etcetera. Although this allows
us to use a well-known and straightforward representation formalism (production rules),
exceptions on exceptions can make a System unworkable while it takes a large amount of
effort to incorporate all these exceptions (Oskamp, 1990). The solution we chose is to
find a compromise between the high quality aimed at and the available law-modelling
capacity by not incorporating exceptions that hardly ever occur (according to our
experts). High quality does not equal perfection. Consequently, we may rely on JES to
handle correctly simple cases that occur frequently. All other cases are considered to be
non-standard and should be recognized äs such during the preliminary categorization
mentioned earlier.
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2.3.4. The pitfalls of the tool being used
The actual use of the System may lead to pitfalls of a different kind which will be
discussed more generally in later sections. Here we provide a few JES-related examples.
The WVO requires that the quality of the water is considered in the process of granting
the licence. The discharge should consequently be balanced against the quality of the
receiving water. This could mean that the first ten companies that request a licence receive
one because the water-pollution level is still acceptable, and the eleventh Company is
denied a licence. The competition issues arising between applicants is something that
should be considered.
Another complicating factor is "sustainable development", a concept adopted by the
policy makers. The leading thought being that environmental factors can be expressed in
economic terms, thus providing the means for hopeful discussions on simultaneous
economical growth and environmental preservation. The latter aims at sustaining future
society on an acceptable level. The concepts involved should be considered in an expert
System such äs JES. But since guidelines and practical applications of those guidelines
are not yet available and since such an approach would need more data on waterways and
interregional effects, political instructions cannot be incorporated in JES at the moment.
3. CIS
The second case study looks into the supply of Information and the Information
interrelationships within the judicature, in particular with respect to the sentencing of
courts in criminal cases. A research project on this subject is defined by an ad hoc project
team in which judges, scientists and Software engineers participate. Preliminary analyses
have revealed the development of a Communication Infrastructure for the registration,
Provision and development of common Sentencing knowledge äs inain objective. Hence
we refer to the project äs CIS.
3.1. Background
Empiricists frequently observe the occurrence of differences between Dutch courts in
sentences adjudicated in comparable criminal cases [e.g., Berghuis, 1992]. These
differences are unwanted and can contribute to a growing distrust in the legal System by
the general public. Although Dutch judges are independent and have considerable
freedom in choosing type and weight of punishment, they have to take into account the
seriousness of the criminal act and the circumstances of the accused - not their personal
taste in these matters.
The differences in sentencing can be explained by looking at the knowledge that is
available to judges for sentencing. We distinguish three categories:
a. Individual expertise. This is sentencing knowledge derived from personal
experience by a Professional judge. With regard to the identification and
assessment of personal circumstances of the accused and to the veracity of his
motives and intentions this type of knowledge is indispensable. For the greater part
this knowledge is intuitive. The personal conviction of the judge plays a decisive
role. The same goes for the Interpretation of Statements of experts and social
workers. Ambiguous interpretations are sometimes unavoidable.
b. Professional knowledge. This is knowledge that is generally acknowledged by the
Professional group of judges äs common knowledge. As any professional
common legal knowledge, it should be accessible in handbooks, jurisprudence and
precedent Professional knowledge on sentencing is not available in any of these
media.
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c. Knowledge about legal principles. Knowledge about legal principles is widely
published in the traditional media. Judges often have to decide hard cases
[Dworkin, 1978] where neither professional knowledge nor individual expertise is
available. These decisions are to be taken and with responsibility. The most
important criterium for these decisions is normative and involves taking into
account the well-known principles regarding the role of judges within the
constitutional state, and the social and legal structures which form it. Responsible
judgments in hard cases are acknowledged to be based on legal principles of a very
general nature which hardly allow straightforward answers.
Individual expertise and knowledge about principles are available in the present day
sentencing practice. Professional sentencing knowledge is not. Prerequisite for the
possible development of acknowledged professional sentencing knowledge is the case-
law publication of relevant circumstances, applied sentences and explicit reasons.
However, in published cases, argumentation of sentences is generic and extensionally
void: "(...) is in accordance with the gravity of the criminal act and with the
circumstances of the accused (...)" has become the cliche argument which is generally
approved of by the Dutch High Court. The actual discussion of assessments in
sentencing is in Dutch legal practice restricted to the council meeting of the judges, that
judge a particular case. The proceedings of these meetings are secret. Accordingly, the
exchange of assessments between courts, the debating of cases amongst professional
judges is severely limited. This prevents autopoiesos [Witteveen, 1992] of appropriate
professional knowledge. Thus, the first and foremost conditions for the development of
professional sentencing knowledge are currently not met in Dutch legal tradition.
Consequently, each individual sentencing decision constitutes a hard case and is based on
(a) individual expertise regarding assessment of the circumstances of the case and on (b)
vague normative principles regarding the adjudication of punishment to assessed
circumstances.
3.2. A possible solution
It is expected that the availability of professional knowledge will enhance the rationality
of sentencing. The professional knowledge that has to be made available to the judges are
records of previous sentences and the assessments and argumentations which motivate
the specific sentence. These records can be used by the judges äs a tool to study viable
assessments and cominon sentences in later cases.
The first Step towards a solution is a database with restricted access in which the
sentencing Information äs revealed in secret council meetings about cases will be stored in
text format. This database should be accessible to all (secret) council meetings, thus
providing an infrastructure for coinmunication between courts and a medium for the
professional debating of sentencing knowledge. It is to be noted that Information
technology has only very recently come up with tools to realize such an infrastructure.
Since there is no professional sentencing knowledge available äs yet, the database will
initially lack structure. Therefore, the second step is to gain professional sentencing
knowledge from the database. The goal of the research program is to analyze the
sentencing Information and to find (or create) commonly acknowledged sentencing
knowledge in the debate between courts and judges. The outcome of this study can be
used for initial modelling and fonnalization in a knowledge base that can access the
database. The resulting System will be used for enhanced study programs and further
discussion on the theory and application of the sentencing knowledge.
With changing insights into the professional knowledge the database and the knowlege
base have to be adaptable and extendable. Knowledge-representation formalisms will
have to be appropriate in this respect. Based on our experience with JES we assume that
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the target knowledge will conceptually be structured in the rule-exception formal which
may be represented in production rules. Knowledge-maintenance tasks will concentrate
on handling refinement of exceptions and conflict resolution between them.
3.3. The foreseeable pitfalls
3.3.1. Knowledge elicitation
The most alluring pitfall of the CIS project for knowledge engineers is to assume that
Professional sentencing knowledge actually exists and to venture it into a model. This
attitude is prone to the modelling of an individual judge's expertise that will prove not to
be generally acceptable. It has been adopted in an earlier project [Vollbehr, 1991].
Many other pitfalls are for a large part similar to those faced in the JES project. The
broadness of the sentencing cases requires that a selection is made narrowing the
domains. The communication between the jurists and the developers will, especially at
the Start, cause misunderstanding and stress. The different teams will have to do their
utmost to remain on 'speaking terms'.
The problem of exceptions plays a different role than it did in JES. Here, the exceptions
in assessments are essential to the System - nevertheless, how do we notice the
exceptions, and to which rules are they exceptions? Another way of looking at this pitfall
is that shared Professional knowledge may not actually emerge when using and
developing the system.
3.3.2. The pitfalls of the tool being used
Assuming the System to be successful, we can foresee its use to lead to pitfalls of a
different kind. We mention a few.
By making more data available to judges a Situation is created that, whilst they can take
notice of professional sentencing knowledge, judges have the responsibility to do so. In
other words: a System äs proposed could make their task more complex. Therefore, much
consideration has to be given to the search mechanisms and to a conceptually transparent
knowledge representation.
The basis of sentencing is the notion that there is a choice in every case that can do justice
to the personal circumstances and still lead to equality in the sentencing. Of course, the
choices are supposed to be made by capable judges. If all assessments can be monitored,
judgements can become questionable. This questioning can undermine the credibility of
judgements and judges. As a result they may undermine the base of our sentencing.
Systems such äs CIS may thus save us from the frying pan into the fire. After all, the
urge behind the project is the current undermining of our trust in the legal System due to
differences in sentencing.
4. Is and ought revisited
Further analysis of the case studies reveals the growth of knowledge to provide a serious
cause for a political debate and for the revisiting of age-old legal-theoretical and practical
issues: the relations between what is and what ought to be.
Knowledge about what is and about what ought to be is closely interrelated. This
interrelationship is bidirectional (a) from what is known towards what ought to be and (b)
from what ought to be towards what is known.
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4.1. From what is known to be to what ought to be
Legal and political theory agree that no logical relationship can be established between
what ought to be and what is known to be. Nevertheless, we seem to generate strong
feelings on what we should (not) do, äs soon äs we find ourselves able to accomplish
something due to newly acquired empirical knowledge. Consequently, other, more
practical methods for generating normative knowledge have been created, notably
democratic procedures. If we know how to destroy the ozone layer we nnay thus
(democratically) answer the question whether we ought to do so. As long äs we do not
know the ozone layer to be impaired, normative questions regarding the ozone layer are
nonexistent. As a matter of consequence, we suggest that the more we know empirically,
the more normative questions we have to answer.
4.2. From what ought to be to what is known to be
Legal and political theory also agree that there are limits to the norm-issued
constructability of reality by adininistration. If we have collectively decided that we ought
not destroy it, there seem to reinain a few problems to be solved in order to reach a state
in which the empirical world shows an unimpaired ozone layer. For an effective
administration we should, for instance, monitor the production (and use) of all matter that
may contribute to changes in the ozone layer. As a matter of consequence we suggest that
the more we know about what ought to be, the more empirical knowledge has to be made
available in order to procure an appropriate state of affairs.
The relationships between empirical and normative knowledge may provide a vicious
ekele, where additional empirical knowledge creates a need for additional norms and
where additional norms create a need for additional empirical knowledge. An equilibrium
in this process will be reached, according to the law of dimishing returns; an equilibrium
will be upset if the marginal needs are increasing. Our Impression is that especially the
communication and registration potential of infonnation technology upsets the existing
equilibria because they drastically increase the possible growth of empirical knowledge.
To illustrate our point we present two scenarios, which can easily reduce our promising
case studies into nightmares:
JES The development of JES was inspired partly by efficiency needs (which have
been met and which we leave outside the discussion) and partly by the
normative need to coordinate policies between granting bodies. Consequently,
empirical knowledge about the amounts of allowed pollutants has become
available. This, in its turn, may pose the question of how much pollutants will
be allowed in the environment. After any answer, additional normative
knowledge has to be generated with respect to the actions to be taken when the
limit has been reached (or has been overshot). The administration will need
additional empirical knowledge to decide on the resulting questions regarding,
for instance, commercial competition. Eventually an equilibrium (for instance,
around the concept of sustainable development) may be reached. Somewhere
during this process, however, it will become clear that the empirical Information
available can be used for several different purposes, say, by the Revenue
Administration. This circumstance may induce the upset of another equilibrium,
etcetera. We are confronted with a domino effect.
CIS The development of CIS was inspired by a normative need: the decrease of
differences in sentencing in comparable cases. The research for empirical
knowledge regarding sentencing policy is induced, which may lead to the
increase of normative knowledge regarding sentencing. Here, an equilibrium
may be reached. However, the additional empirical knowledge may lead to
additional normative questions which could be answered, using the continued
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CIS empirical data. It might even be used to judge judges, and accordingly to
destroy a particularly delicate balance in a democratic society.
We have directed our scenarios towards the envisionment of serious damage to society
caused by vicious norm-knowledge circles. However, we feel that the scenarios
mentioned might äs easily have been egged on towards utopian results. We have shown
that serious practical questions are being posed to democratic societies by the potenüal of
information-technological tools. These problems need democratic attention and Solutions,
which are traditionally being reached in debate.
5. Equilibria
We briefly review the foremost equilibria that have proven to be useful in a (democratic)
political and legal-theoretical debate and suggest the possible upsets issued by
information-technological tools. We mention (a) egalitarianism vs. individualism, (b)
checks & balances and (c) perfectionism vs. liberalism.
5.1. Egalitarianism vs. individualisation
Equality and individualism are fundamental legal issues. They are institutionalized in the
(independent) legislative and judicatural powers, respectively . One of the foundations for
these distinct powers is to be found in the amount of practical knowledge available.
Legislative generality is based on an assumption of equality that does not actually exist.
Appropriate individualization is performed by the judicature, instantiating individual cases
to general rules. They are supposed to know the individual circumstances that the
legislator cannot possibly take into account.
The emergence of information-technological tools makes the development of common
individualization knowledge possible (cf. the CIS project). This type of knowledge may
be used by the legislator, again suggesting a shift from judicatural to legislative power.
However, the legislator will never be able to predict developments in society and will
consequently seldom be tempted to be overspecific in his legislation. We do not see
serious dangers needing discussion in this area, provided that the administration and the
legislator refrain from using information-technological tools to control the judicature.
5.2. Checks & balances
In the Netherlands, the discussions about the impacts of information-technological tools
have for a considerable time been focused on questions relating to registration and
privacy. We consider the privacy-registration discussion to be a Symptom of marginal
trust of the public in administration and vice versa. As such, the discussion has read
mistrust in the public's Opposition to registration äs well äs in the administrations picking
at the public's privacy. This type of (regularly justified) mutual mistrust has made the
democratic society dependent on an elaborate System of checks and balances, most
notably explicitated in the traditional distinctipn of the powers of state (legislator,
judicature and administration) and in the positions of the Public Prosecutor and the
accused.
Van Gunsteren [1972] has argued severe limits to exist for the effective pursuit of
administrative goals. These limits seein, however, to have been stretched by information-
technological tools. Extensive registration in itself is considered to be politically neutral.
It will facilitate effective administration äs readily äs administrative abuse of power.
Nonetheless, extensive registration suggests a big, simultaneous power shift towards
administration äs soon äs information-technology driven, knowledge-based effectuation
is realized. We suggest that these shifts are most likely to be brought about by short-term,
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ad hoc problems in society (cf. the current debate on the Integration of tax administrations
and social welfare administrations in the Netherlands in relation to controlling welfare
abuse and illegitimate Immigration).
We also suggest that the simultaneous power shifts should neither be discussed ad hoc
nor be forgotten in the heat of the moment. It is not immediately clear, however, in what
way the administrative power could be checked. Perhaps it can be done by redirecting the
emerging registration potential towards the administration itself. Again, a vicious circle
seems to emerge. Where and how this will reach (or should be brought to) a stable
equilibrium is an existential challenge to todays political and legal theory (and practice).
5.3. Perfectionism vs. liberalism
A perfectionist ethical theory Claims universal morality, its scope reaching into the most
private of individual actions. Perfectionist ethical theory knows any of our actions to be
good or bad, anywhere and all the time. A famous and extremely influential example is
provided by Aristotle. Opposed to perfectionist ethical theories are those, that only claim
validity for actions that may affect the freedom of others. Perfectionist and liberal ethical
theories have bred perfectionist and liberal political parties, who, in their turn, have
provided societies with hybrid perfectionist-liberal legal Systems.
Prima fade it seems more natural for perfectionist-oriented legal Systems to strive for
comprehensive registration than for more liberal-oriented Systems. History bears out this
intuition if we classify the communist Systems amongst the perfectionist-oriented and
notice their inherent huge administrative overhead. We allow the comprehensive
registration in these Systems to have brought about an anti-democratic upset compared
with our traditional equilibria of power, thus yielding possibilities for abuse that have not
been checked by knowledge-based, public discussions of the behaviour of administration
itself. We think this bears out our observations in the last subsection. We maintain,
however, that extensive registration is in itself politically neutral. It may be effectively
used in the pursuit of liberal äs well äs in the pursuit of perfectionist goals.
6. Conclusions
The growth of empirical knowledge issues the demand of additional normative
knowledge and the growth of normative knowledge issues the demand for empirical
knowledge. An equilibrium between empirical and normative knowledge demands may
be reached. However, recent Information technological developments have disturbed the
existing equilibrium or will soon do so. As a consequence, power shifts in the trias
politica, organic to the constitutional state, will occur. These shifts need serious
democratic attention.
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